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REVIEW
A review of virulent Newcastle disease 
viruses in the United States and the role of wild 
birds in viral persistence and spread
Vienna R. Brown1* and Sarah N. Bevins2
Abstract 
Newcastle disease is caused by virulent strains of Newcastle disease virus (NDV), which causes substantial morbid-
ity and mortality events worldwide in poultry. The virus strains can be differentiated as lentogenic, mesogenic, or 
velogenic based on a mean death time in chicken embryos. Currently, velogenic strains of NDV are not endemic in 
United States domestic poultry; however, these strains are present in other countries and are occasionally detected 
in wild birds in the U.S. A viral introduction into domestic poultry could have severe economic consequences due to 
the loss of production from sick and dying birds, the cost of control measures such as depopulation and disinfection 
measures, and the trade restrictions that would likely be imposed as a result of an outbreak. Due to the disease-free 
status of the U.S. and the high cost of a potential viral incursion to the poultry industry, a qualitative risk analysis was 
performed to evaluate the vulnerabilities of the U.S. against the introduction of virulent strains of NDV. The most likely 
routes of virus introduction are explored and data gathered by several federal agencies is provided. Recommenda-
tions are ultimately provided for data that would be useful to further understand NDV on the landscape and to utilize 
all existing sampling opportunities to begin to comprehend viral movement and further characterize the risk of NDV 
introduction into the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Newcastle disease (ND) occurs in poultry and can 
have devastating economic effects on global domestic 
poultry production. Newcastle disease virus (NDV) 
was previously synonymous with avian paramyxo‑
virus type 1 (APMV‑1); however, due to changes in 
taxonomy is now referred to as avian avulavirus [1]. 
Avian avulavirus and NDV are used interchangeably 
in this manuscript. NDV can be distinguished into 
three distinct pathotypes based on mean death time 
in chicken embryos, lentogenic (40–60  h), mesogenic 
(60–90  h), and velogenic (90–150  h) [2]. The amino 
acid sequence at the fusion cleavage site is related to 
virulence as specific sequences can be cleaved systemi‑
cally as compared to others which can only be cleaved 
in specific host tissues leading to a local infection. In 
this way, all velogenic viruses are virulent but not all 
virulent strains are velogenic. This disease is listed 
by the World Health Organisation for Animals (OIE) 
as vitally important for avian species and products 
and virus detection in a specific geographical loca‑
tion often leads to trade restrictions and embargos [3]. 
Virulent Newcastle disease is listed as a Tier 1 USDA 
Select Agent as it is a pathogen of national concern 
and a significant threat to animal agriculture in the 
U.S. Only mesogenic and velogenic viruses found in 
poultry species, require mandatory reporting to the 
OIE. Virulent strains, typically mesogens and velo‑
gens, of avian avulavirus are endemic in the majority 
of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as parts 
of Central and South America in domestic poultry 
species [4]. In the United States, virulent strains are 
present in wild pigeons and cormorants, but domes‑
tic poultry are free of these virus forms. Detection of 
velogenic NDV in domestic poultry could have devas‑
tating financial effects on the industry as well as the 
nation at large. The last outbreak of velogenic NDV in 
the United States occurred in 2002–2003 in Califor‑
nia, Nevada, Arizona, and Texas in domestic poultry 
(confined to backyard flocks in the latter three states, 
but did spillover into a commercial operation in Cali‑
fornia) resulting in the culling of 3.16 million birds at a 
cost of $121 million [5]. Low virulence strains of NDV 
occur throughout the world in both domestic and wild 
bird species. Understanding the importance wild bird 
species may play in the maintenance and transmission 
of this virus in addition to their proximity to domestic 
poultry production is needed in order to minimize the 
risk of infection. This manuscript further describes the 
zoonotic potential for this disease, as well as available 
vaccines, and commonly used diagnostic tools. Fur‑
thermore, a risk assessment is described and recom‑
mendations are provided.
1.1  Description of the virus and infection kinetics
A negative sense, single stranded RNA virus is responsi‑
ble for Newcastle disease, also referred to as avian avula‑
virus, which is capable of infecting more than 250 species 
of birds [4]. This virus is endemic in many parts of the 
world and has been known to cause epizootic outbreaks 
in domestic poultry on six of the seven continents [6]. 
The genome contains 6 genes and their corresponding 
structural proteins: (1) a nucleocapsid protein (NP), (2) a 
phosphoprotein (P), (3) a matrix protein (M), (4) a fusion 
protein (F), (5) a hemagglutinin‑neuraminidase protein 
(HN), and (6) a RNA polymerase (L) [7, 8].
The molecular basis for the variation in virulence has 
been determined and is attributed to amino acids at the 
cleavage site on the fusion protein, which mediates cell‑
virus and cell–cell interaction and fusion [9]. Three or 
more arginine (R) or lysine (K) residues starting at posi‑
tion 113 and a phenylalanine (F) at position 117 are 
found in all virulent strains of the virus. The precursor 
fusion protein, F0, must be cleaved to proteins F1 and 
F2 by host cell proteases in order for infection to begin 
via cell fusion and the activation of hemolytic properties; 
the proteases recognize the specific amino acid motif at 
the F protein cleavage site [3, 10]. Viruses with a virulent 
cleavage site can be cleaved by proteases found in nearly 
every cell in the body allowing for a systemic infection 
to occur and extensive viral replication; however, if the F 
protein cleavage site does not contain that specific amino 
acid motif, cleavage can only be mediated by trypsin and 
trypsin‑like enzymes found in the respiratory and intes‑
tinal tracts which leads to restricted host site replication 
[11, 12]. The hemagglutinin‑neuraminidase protein also 
plays an instrumental role in tissue tropism and virulence 
of NDV by promoting the fusion activity of the F pro‑
tein, facilitating host cell penetration, and removing sialic 
acid from progeny virus to prevent self‑agglutination [9]. 
Enveloped viruses, including NDV, have been found to 
enter host cells via direct fusion methods in which the 
viral envelope fuses with the plasma membrane of the 
host cell or a receptor‑mediated endocytosis mechanism 
in which the virus binds to a specific receptor on the host 
cell surface and membrane fusion results in translocation 
of the nucleocapsid into the cytoplasm of the host cell 
[13, 14].
It is important to note that avian avulaviruses has been 
used as a therapeutic agent in the treatment of human 
cancer. Replication‑competent oncolytic viruses, such 
as NDV, have a pronounced anti‑tumoral effect by both 
local and systemic inoculation routes [15, 16]. NDV 
has been found to efficiently and selectively replicate 
within and destroy tumor cells, but not normal cells, 
and intra‑lesion inoculation in an athymic mouse model 
has resulted in complete tumor regression [17]. Avian 
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avulaviruses can stably express foreign genes and as 
such, experimental trails have been conducted where the 
gene for IL‑2 is incorporated [18]. NDV in combination 
with IL‑2 was found to be especially T cell stimulatory 
which increases the anti‑tumor capacity. A strong type 
1 interferon response is induced in non‑permissive spe‑
cies, such as humans, which results in the anti‑neoplastic 
and immune stimulatory properties observed with NDV 
infection [19].
1.2  Transmission and clinical signs
NDV is primarily transmitted via inhalation or inges‑
tion of virus shed in feces and respiratory secretions by 
infected birds for variable lengths of time [3, 4, 20]. Some 
virus isolates have been found to be transmitted through 
the egg to the hatching chick [21]. Furthermore, virus has 
been found to be present in all parts of the carcass and 
is able to persist for many months on both chicken skin 
and bone marrow if kept at refrigerated temperatures [4]. 
The virus is relatively stable outside of a host and in the 
environment, thus making fomite transmission a possi‑
bility. Infectious virus has been found to survive 7  days 
in the summer, 14  days during the spring, and 30  days 
in the winter in poultry houses that were contaminated 
by infected birds [22]. An older study demonstrated the 
duration of infectious virus using various materials and 
temperatures which suggests that NDV is a highly stable 
virus on multiple types of materials and at various tem‑
peratures [23] and confirms the concern of fomites as a 
vehicle for virus introduction or during an outbreak.
The incubation period is typically 2–15  days post‑
exposure. Gallinaceous birds (chickens, turkeys, grouse, 
pheasants, and partridges) shed infectious virus for up to 
1–2 weeks following infection; however, psittacine birds 
(parrots, parakeets, and macaws) have demonstrated the 
capacity to shed infectious virus for several months to 
1 year following infection, primarily via respiratory secre‑
tions and feces [24, 25]. It is likely that the mortality rate 
for chicks born with virulent NDV infections would be 
very high, especially as maternal antibody levels waned.
The clinical manifestation of a velogenic strain of NDV, 
typically results in a primarily intestinal infection charac‑
terized by hemorrhagic lesions found in the intestines of 
dead birds (termed viscerotropic velogenic) or a predom‑
inantly respiratory and neurological infection (referred to 
as neurotropic velogenic) [6]. Neurological signs are also 
often observed with velogenic infections, especially in 
birds with partial immunity who often go on to develop a 
chronic infection, and the signs typically include tremors, 
ataxia, torticollis, and paresis or paralysis of the wings or 
legs which develop several days post‑infection [4]. Both 
wild and domestic species can develop similar neuro‑
tropic signs. Mesogenic viruses can cause clinical disease 
which typically include respiratory and neurological signs 
but the infection is self‑limiting, and mortality is rare in 
older birds unless there are secondary bacterial infections 
[4]. Lesions associated with both velogenic and meso‑
genic strains of NDV infection are most often detected in 
the central nervous system (CNS), alimentary tract, renal 
system, or respiratory tract and viruses virulent in wild 
bird populations tend to affect the CNS or kidneys or to 
cause systemic disease that results in rapid mortality in 
the absence of recognizable gross or histopathological 
lesions [3].
1.3  Geographical distribution
Newcastle disease is believed to have first been reported 
in 1926 in both Newcastle‑on‑Tyne, England and the 
island of Java, which is part of current day Indonesia; 
however, there is evidence of prior emergence based on 
literature in which outbreaks of disease similar to NDV 
were reported [26]. The virus is now endemic or causes 
epizootic events on a global scale [6]. Avian avulavirus 
strains are phylogenetically classified into class I and 
class II and class II are further differentiated into separate 
genotypes based on genetic and geographic variations 
[27]. Pigeon paramyxovirus type 1 (PPMV‑1) is a type of 
avian avulavirus and is listed under class II, genotype VIb 
viruses (Additional file 1).
The viral presence in both Mexico and Canada was spe‑
cifically investigated as their disease status influences risk 
of viral introduction into the United States based on close 
proximity. Virulent strains of NDV are endemic in Mex‑
ico, isolates detected typically belong to the class II, gen‑
otype V viruses [28]. Sampling of free‑ranging wild birds, 
captive wild birds, and domestic poultry demonstrate 
continued circulation and evolution of these viruses [29]. 
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency states that viru‑
lent strains of NDV are exotic to poultry in Canada; how‑
ever, similar to the U.S., wild birds in Canada have been 
found to harbor these viruses [30].
2  Wild bird reservoir species
Birds of the Columbidae family (pigeons and doves) and 
double‑crested cormorants (Phalacrocorax auritus) have 
been implicated as reservoir species for virulent strains 
of NDV in North America [31]. Sampling of mute swans 
(Cygnus olor) in the Great Lakes region and along the 
Atlantic coast of the United States resulted in the detec‑
tion of live virus and NDV antibodies in 8.7 and 60% of 
birds, respectively [32]. This suggests that mute swans 
are regularly exposed to avian avulaviruses and may con‑
tribute to viral maintenance in the environment. Kim 
et al. sampled waterfowl and shorebirds from eight states 
within the U.S. and compared them to samples from live 
bird markets collected between 2005 and 2006 and found 
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genetically related viruses [33]. Research on NDV in wild 
ducks, gulls, and shorebirds found novel viral diversity, 
but no fusion gene sequences associated with high patho‑
genicity in poultry [34]. These findings indicate that viral 
transmission may occur between wild birds and poul‑
try, but virulent strains are likely not reservoired by the 
majority of wild birds, with pigeons, doves, and double‑
crested cormorants being the exception.
Interestingly, evaluation of wild birds on four conti‑
nents between 1997 and 2014 resulted in the repeated 
isolation of vaccine‑derived NDV [35]. These vaccine‑
derived isolates were found in 17 species with the highest 
frequency detected in Columbiformes and Anseriformes. 
Not surprisingly, the vaccine strain viruses found cor‑
responded to those that are most widely utilized as vac‑
cines—La Sota and B1. These findings are troubling as 
passaging through wild bird species may provide selective 
pressures that could lead to antigenic drift or an increase 
in virulence. While concerning, there is no documented 
case of vaccine strains recombining with wild type strains 
in wild birds; however, research to date on NDV viral 
dynamics in wild birds has been limited and more thor‑
ough exploration could better determine if this is occur‑
ring. There is, however, one case of a low virulence wild 
bird strain from class II genotype I NDV mutating to a 
virulent strain after circulating for many months in thou‑
sands of chickens that lead to the 1998 ND outbreak in 
Australia [36].
2.1  Double‑crested cormorants
The first documented mortality event associated with 
NDV in wild avian species, young double‑crested cormo‑
rants, was first reported in Canada in 1975. Since then, 
several other outbreaks have occurred in the 1990s and 
2000s in both the U.S. and Canada and sero‑prevalence 
in adult birds is high [37–39]. A study conducted on 
breeding and wintering grounds in the U.S. and Canada 
between 2009 and 2011, found the average antibody 
prevalence in adult birds, across all years and locations, 
to be 85.2% [31]. Live, infectious NDV isolates were iso‑
lated from 6 chicks, half of which exhibited clinical signs 
typical of a NDV infection. Furthermore, virulent NDV 
from outbreaks in double‑crested cormorants have been 
implicated in causing mortality in pelicans, gulls, and 
other shorebirds [40, 41]. Findings suggest that double‑
crested cormorants are regularly exposed to avian avula‑
virus isolates and that these infections are not necessarily 
lethal. They may play an important role in maintaining 
and amplifying the virus in nature. Double‑crested 
cormorants inhabit a large portion of North America 
between their breeding and wintering grounds and this 
nearly ubiquitous distribution underlines their important 
role in the spread of NDV [42].
2.2  Columbidae birds
Numerous species of wild and domestic pigeons and 
doves have been implicated in the maintenance and 
transmission of pigeon paramyxovirus serotype 1 
(PPMV‑1) which is a class II, genotype VIb avian avula‑
virus that is host‑adapted to pigeons and other Columbi‑
form birds [27, 43]. These viruses are virulent variants of 
avian avulavirus that have circulated in pigeons and are 
adapted to this species. These viruses are considered to 
be panzootic despite having originated in the Middle East 
and being detected as early as the 1980s [43]. Columbi‑
form birds are the primary host species; however, spillo‑
ver events into domestic poultry have been reported and 
serial passages through embyronated chicken eggs or 
domestic poultry species appears to result in selection 
for more virulent traits [44, 45]. Clinical signs associated 
with PPMV‑1 infection in layer hens is typically limited 
to a sharp reduction in egg production, mis‑shapen eggs, 
or soft shell eggs [43]. Domestic chickens were experi‑
mentally inoculated with various isolates of PPMV‑1 
viruses intramuscularly and gross and histologic lesions 
were observed as well as morbidity [44]. Overt clinical 
disease was rare and none of the infected chickens suc‑
cumbed to disease during the follow‑up period (14 days 
post‑infection). Immunohistochemistry determined that 
the heart and brain were the primarily affected tissues. 
Sampling in 2013 detected seropositivity in 11.7% of 
Columbiformes evaluated which included Eurasian col‑
lared doves (Streptopelia decaocto), rock doves (Columba 
livia), and zebra doves (Geopelia striata) [46]. All of the 
viruses isolated from this study were found in rock doves 
and found to be virulent strains furthering the assertion 
that rock doves are associated with PPMV‑1 virus main‑
tenance in the United States. They are found uniformly 
throughout the U.S. [47].
3  Domestic poultry
3.1  Geographical distribution
The United States poultry industry generates $48 billion 
in revenue and is comprised primarily of broiler chickens 
(8.5 billion birds), layer hens (299 million birds), and tur‑
keys (238 million birds) [48]. Iowa, Indiana, Ohio, Penn‑
sylvania, and Texas are the top five layer producing states 
and are responsible for 52% of all the eggs produced 
within the United States [49]; whereas top broiler pro‑
ducing states include Georgia, Arkansas, Alabama, North 
Carolina, and Mississippi [50]. Figure  1 depicts poultry 
inventory across the entire U.S., irrespective of bird or 
farm type.
Domestic poultry production certainly overlaps with 
the geographical distribution of the two primary wild 
avian reservoir species. The last detectable outbreak of 
virulent NDV in domestic poultry in the U.S. occurred 
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in 2002–2003, starting in illegally imported game fowl 
[52]. This outbreak initiated in southern California before 
moving into Nevada, Arizona, and ultimately, Texas; with 
infections being confined to backyard flocks in all states 
but California where the virus did spillover into com‑
mercial operations [53]. Phylogenetic analysis of the virus 
showed that the strains were very similar to those circu‑
lating in Mexico and Honduras and that the California, 
Nevada, and Arizona viruses were a result of a single 
point introduction of the virus.
3.2  Commercial domestic poultry management
Exact information and specific details related to poultry 
production in the United States is particularly difficult to 
acquire and much of it is kept as proprietary data. A huge 
majority (likely > 98%) of domestic poultry are intensively 
managed with nearly 100% of breeding stock and 100% 
of large, commercial poultry operations existing in this 
type of system. In recent years, there have been changes 
in labeling (ex: cage free, free range) and subsequently, 
management practices have been modified to reflect 
Figure 1 Distribution of poultry production within the United States, 2012. Figure from the United States Department of Agriculture, 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (2015), used with permission—[51].
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these production systems. However, these “specialty” 
production systems compose a tiny fraction of the overall 
production of meat and eggs in the U.S.
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) is a 
collaborative program between industry and state and 
federal governments that was originally established to 
abolish pullorum disease and today serves to enhance 
international trade and prevent the introduction of pests 
and diseases that would be costly to the poultry industry 
and agricultural resources. This program includes com‑
mercial poultry, turkeys, waterfowl, exhibition poultry, 
backyard poultry, and game birds. Fourteen biosecurity 
principles were drafted and presented at the Biennial 
Conference for NPIP, which occurred August  30th to Sep‑
tember  1st, 2016 at which time they were amended and 
ultimately, voted on. All of the proposed principles were 
passed in either their exact drafted form or a slightly 
amended version. Commercial poultry operations in all 
participating states (which includes all U.S. states, except 
Hawaii) that desire to transport birds across state lines or 
engage in international export are then responsible for 
implementing the principles on their premise. Principle 
#14 describes the auditing process, but briefly, auditing is 
performed by the Official State Agency to ensure compli‑
ance at least once every 2 years.
Information regarding the majority of domestic poul‑
try operations and the likely impending biosecurity 
regulations from the NPIP have been described to pro‑
vide information on the management of commercial 
poultry and insight relevant to biosecurity concerns and 
practices. This intensive management and attention to 
high risk routes of contamination offers a vantage point 
related to preventing Newcastle disease virus or detect‑
ing and confining an outbreak very quickly, should a velo‑
genic strain be introduced. Biosecurity must be enacted 
along with vaccination protocols to enhance the efficacy 
of the control program.
3.3  Common vaccination protocols in the United States 
for commercial poultry operations
The domestic poultry industry is not mandated to pro‑
vide vaccinations against specific pathogens by any gov‑
erning body; thus, each producer can determine what 
vaccines they would like to administer. This is typically 
based on geographical location, life span, perceived risks, 
and other components; however, industry experts believe 
the prevalence of NDV vaccination to be close to 100% 
for intensively managed domestic poultry in the United 
States. Long‑lived birds, specifically broiler breeders and 
layers, are usually vaccinated multiple times for NDV 
whereas shorter lived birds typically receive one vaccine, 
either in ovo or at 1 day of age in the hatchery (Personal 
communication, U.S. Poultry and Egg Association, 2016). 
The in ovo vaccine is a recombinant herpesvirus of tur‑
keys/Newcastle disease virus vaccine, whereas the vac‑
cine administered to day‑old birds is typically a live NDV 
vaccine. Broiler breeders often receive multiple rounds 
of vaccinations for NDV of both live and inactivated vac‑
cines in order to provide the hatchling with sufficient lev‑
els of maternal antibodies. Layers tend to be vaccinated 
less intensively and typically receive a live vaccine as it 
is simpler to administer (often as a spray or in drinking 
water). The NDV vaccines are primarily designed to pre‑
vent endemic low virulence strains that cause mild res‑
piratory signs from infecting domestic poultry which, if 
unresolved at the time of slaughter, often result in carcass 
condemnation which causes losses for producers. Indus‑
try insiders believe the U.S. domestic poultry population 
is still, despite high levels of vaccination, highly suscep‑
tible to velogenic strains of NDV in the event of viral 
introduction.
3.4  Domestic backyard poultry management
The level of management provided to backyard poultry 
flocks is extremely variable, although it is very common 
that these flocks are more extensively managed as com‑
pared to commercial poultry and likely < 10% of backyard 
poultry are vaccinated in any capacity (Personal commu‑
nication, Merial, 2016). While backyard poultry flocks 
are a small fraction of U.S. poultry production, they are 
of greater concern to be exposed to virulent avian avula‑
virus because of the lack of vaccination and biosecurity. 
They may serve as amplification hosts which increases 
the probability that virulent NDV could spill over into 
commercial poultry flocks due to large amounts of circu‑
lating virus. As an example, Europe is considered free of 
virulent NDV in commercial poultry; however, outbreaks 
in backyard birds occurs periodically [54, 55]. Given the 
breadth of exposure of backyard poultry to wild birds 
and environmental factors, surveillance efforts in these 
domestic birds may be useful to gather data on circulat‑
ing viruses and their pathogenicity.
4  Zoonotic potential
Avian avulaviruses are capable of infecting humans 
and infection typically results in conjunctivitis and/or 
influenza‑like symptoms, including fever, headache, and 
malaise [4]. Exposure to a large amount of virus is nec‑
essary, thus human infections are most common in indi‑
viduals working on poultry farms or in slaughterhouses. 
There has been one documented instance in which a 
42‑year old man with a history of non‑Hodgkin’s lym‑
phoma developed a lethal pneumonia following a periph‑
eral blood stem cell transplant [56]. Genomic sequencing 
demonstrated that the NDV strain found in the deceased 
patient was likely an isolate of urban‑dwelling doves and 
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pigeons. The patient was not known to have any contact 
with avian species and the authors hypothesize that he 
was exposed in his urban neighborhood either through 
direct contact or aerosolized bird feces containing infec‑
tious virus.
Despite the ability for avian avulaviruses to infect 
humans this pathogen should be considered a low prior‑
ity for public health agencies because of the high infec‑
tious dose and the mild clinical symptoms observed in 
immune‑competent individuals. Fomite transmission 
of NDV is a documented route of spread due to robust 
viral stability; thus, special precautions should be taken 
for individuals that work closely with domestic poul‑
try and are immune‑compromised or for workers that 
co‑habitate with an individual that is immune‑compro‑
mised [3].
5  Vaccines
Multiple vaccination regimens are used throughout the 
world for domestic poultry and are fairly efficacious in 
preventing clinical disease, although there is no steriliz‑
ing immunity and vaccinated birds may be infected and 
shed virulent NDV without becoming ill [57, 58]. All 
NDV strains are of the same serotype, thus nearly any 
strain can be used in a vaccine because of similar anti‑
genic properties resulting in a fairly uniform immune 
response irrespective of the vaccine strain [59]. However, 
further work has demonstrated that vaccine strains that 
are homologous with the challenge virus or field strains 
expected to infect the birds in a given region, are able to 
substantially reduce oral shedding as compared to heter‑
ologous vaccines; furthermore, the evolution of virulent 
strains of NDV may be facilitated by the interaction of 
vaccine strains and endemically circulating viruses that 
have large phylogenetic or antigenic variation in compar‑
ison to the vaccine strain [6, 60].
Two vaccination methods are predominant: inactivated 
and live vaccines [61]. Inactivated vaccinations are con‑
siderably more expensive as compared to live vaccines 
due to the need to handle individual birds and provide an 
injection, either intramuscularly or subcutaneously [62]. 
Live vaccines are often provided in mass either via a spray 
or drinking water. Both live and inactivated vaccines are 
produced in specific‑pathogen‑free (SPF) embryonated 
eggs [61].
A wide variety of vaccines and vaccination proto‑
cols are utilized across the globe depending on endemic 
strains, domestic poultry production practices, access to 
a cold chain, and many other factors. The B1 and LaSota 
strains are lentogenic viruses that are commonly used in 
vaccination schemes, often serially [59, 63]. B1 is a very 
mild strain and is often administered initially, followed by 
a booster with a slightly more pathogenic vaccine strain, 
such as LaSota. Initial vaccination typically occurs either 
at 2–4 weeks of age (after maternal antibody has waned) 
or at 1 day of age which results in an active infection that 
will persist until maternal antibody has waned [62]. These 
birds are then re‑vaccinated at 2–4 weeks of age.
The mass inoculation strategy of live (sometimes atten‑
uated) vaccines has resulted in concern about the poten‑
tial for reversion to virulence of attenuated strains or the 
leaching of these strains into the environment [6, 62]. In 
fact, Miller et al. articulate three factors that contribute to 
the risk of an outbreak: (1) only a few nucleotide changes 
are needed on the fusion gene to convert a low virulence 
virus to a strain of high virulence, (2) the low virulence 
viruses are endemic nearly universally and large, highly 
mobile reservoirs are capable of moving these viruses 
around the globe, (3) billions of (mostly live) vaccines are 
administered annually, often in a spray or drinking water, 
which likely leads to environmental contamination. 
Importantly, vaccinated poultry have been implicated as 
the reservoir for virulent strains of NDV as a result of the 
ability to become infected with virulent strains follow‑
ing vaccination and shed infectious virus in the absence 
of clinical disease [6]. This topic is still widely discussed 
as some believe shedding of infectious virus is result‑
ant from incomplete or non‑uniform mass vaccination 
methods; however, some evidence does exist to suggest 
that vaccinated birds may serve as reservoirs for viru‑
lent NDV [64]. Furthermore, vaccination may be provid‑
ing selective pressure that favors the evolution of variant 
forms of NDV, especially driven by the genetic homoge‑
neity of hosts, production practices (high density), and 
intensive and imprecise vaccination protocols.
Additionally, a recent review of NDV vaccines by Dim‑
itrov et al. asserts that new vaccine concepts are needed 
as current vaccination protocols are insufficient to quell 
disease under various environmental conditions. Chal‑
lenges identified are specifically related to uneven vac‑
cine application under mass vaccine administration 
techniques, difficulty vaccinating free‑roaming birds, 
especially those of varying ages, obstacles maintaining 
the cold chain, and pre‑existing antibodies which can 
neutralize the vaccine and reduce efficacy [65].
6  Diagnostics
A wide variety of diagnostic tools have been developed 
to determine pathogen identity. These methods are often 
used serially. Samples collected from sick and dying birds 
can be inoculated into embryonated eggs and further dif‑
ferentiation can be undertaken. Mean death time (MDT) 
is a frequently used diagnostic which involves inoculat‑
ing samples into embryonated eggs and determining 
the time in hours required to kill the chicken embryo 
[3]. The intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) and 
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the intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) involve the 
weighted scoring of clinical signs following an intracer‑
ebral or intravenous injection, respectively, in day old 
chicks. ICPI is the test of choice for NDV whereas IVPI 
is used only occasionally and never for official purposes. 
The gold standard for NDV diagnostics is virus isola‑
tion followed by hemagglutination and hemagglutina‑
tion inhibition. Table 1 depicts the MDT, ICPI, and IVPI 
associated with lentogenic, mesogenic, and velogenic 
viruses. These values are derived from Alexander 1998 
but it should be noted that exceptions exist [66]. Further 
pathotyping often occurs when live virus is isolated in 
order to determine strain virulence via the evaluation of 
the amino acid residues at the fusion site.
The costs and challenges associated with obtaining 
SPF eggs and day‑old chicks make real‑time RT‑PCR 
methods an attractive alternative [67]. From a serologi‑
cal perspective, a hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) assay or 
an enzyme‑linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) can be 
used to evaluate the presence of NDV‑specific antibodies 
in the host [6]. Both the HI and ELISA diagnostics can 
be used to detect antigen or antibody. Serological diag‑
nostics do not allow for the differentiation of antibodies 
resultant from exposure to a vaccine strain as compared 
to a virulent NDV isolate; therefore, they are not tre‑
mendously efficacious for the determination of NDV as 
the cause of a specific outbreak because of rampant vac‑
cination. Many commercial operations closely moni‑
tor the serology of a flock at the time of slaughter, often 
using an ELISA (Personal communication, Merial, 2016). 
Based on years of data, a normal range is determined for 
the antibody titer for NDV and anything that exceeds 
that value is subject to further testing and more intensive 
evaluation. This monitoring helps identify an abnormal‑
ity very quickly and mobilize a response in the event of 
an introduction.
7  Emergency preparedness for the United States
A viral incursion of NDV into the U.S. could likely cause 
severe morbidity and mortality in the domestic poultry 
industry in addition to enormous economic losses pri‑
marily associated with trade restrictions. The Newcastle 
Disease Response Plan, The Red Book was created in 
2014 by USDA APHIS Veterinary Services and provides 
strategic guidance for government officials and first 
responders in the event of a NDV outbreak. The manual 
also provides current policy information and a strategic 
framework for the control and eradication of NDV in the 
event of a viral incursion. Furthermore, the FAD Prep 
Document provides information about the Newcastle 
disease virus such that responders and stakeholders can 
have a common understanding of the pathogen etiology.
8  Risk analysis
Globalization, international trade, and migratory wild 
avian species of questionable NDV infection status 
increase the likelihood of virulent avian avulavirus intro‑
duction. A number of routes are of concern, including 
a point introduction via transportation of live birds or 
poultry products, viral persistence on fomites, or con‑
taminated poultry food, water, or supplies. Because of 
the prevalence of wild avian species that are known to 
carry virulent strains of NDV it is also possible that an 
outbreak is initiated by a spillover event in which a viru‑
lent strain of NDV from double‑crested cormorants, rock 
doves, or alternative wild bird types are transmitted to 
domestic poultry. Additionally, backyard domestic poul‑
try pose a risk of viral transmission and amplification due 
to their exposure to wild birds and other environmental 
factors. Finally, because of the high rate of mutation of 
RNA viruses during replication, a virulent strain may be 
introduced to domestic poultry as a result of imprecise 
replication following the introduction of a lowly virulent 
wild bird strain.
8.1  Risk of introduction to the United States
Potential routes of introduction include live bird trans‑
portation [24, 25], fomites [25], poultry product trans‑
portation [68], contaminated food and water [69], 
airborne transmission [70], contaminated vaccines [71, 
72], and non‑avian carriers [74]. This sub‑section focuses 
specifically on potential routes of introduction into the 
United States based on import regulations, the presence 
of wild avian species that have demonstrated a capacity 
to harbor virulent strains of the pathogen, and the wide‑
spread use of live vaccines in conjunction with the inex‑
act replication process of a RNA virus.
8.1.1  Legal movement of live birds
Birds are imported into the United States through one 
of three import centers found in Los Angeles, California; 
Miami, Florida; and New York, New York. All imported 
poultry are subject to a 30  day quarantine irrespective 
of the NDV‑status in the country of origin. Imported 
hatching eggs are differentiated into those derived from 
Table 1 Summary of diagnostic parameters associated 
with avian avulavirus
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NDV‑endemic and NDV‑free countries and they require 
a 30 day quarantine or are immediately released following 
veterinary inspection at the port of entry, respectively.
Import procedures for non‑domestic avian species are 
characterized for: (1) commercial birds—imported for 
resale, breeding, public display, or any other purpose, 
excluding pet birds, zoo birds, research birds, or per‑
forming, theatrical birds; (2) zoo birds—imported to a 
zoo facility for breeding, public display, recreational or 
educational purposes; (3) pet birds (which are further 
classified as U.S. origin and non‑U.S. origin)—imported 
for personal pleasure of their individual owners and are 
not intended for resale (paraphrased from the United 
States Department of Agriculture regulatory guide‑
lines). Regulations for commercial and pet birds (both 
U.S. origin and non‑U.S. origin) are very similar and in 
both instances an import permit is required along with 
a health certificate completed by a certified veterinarian 
in the export country within 30  days of departure. The 
health certificate must indicate that the bird has not been 
vaccinated for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), 
including H5 and H7 subtypes, may not transit through 
regions considered to be high risk for HPAI by the Ani‑
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), must 
have been vaccinated for NDV more than 21 days prior 
to export with a lentogenic strain or not be vaccinated 
(either scenario must be clearly indicated on the health 
certificate), and must be free of any evidence of com‑
municable diseases. Furthermore, imported commercial 
and pet birds are subject to a 30‑day quarantine at one 
of the three import centers; pet birds of U.S. origin can, 
however, complete the quarantine period in the home. 
Zoo bird importation similarly mandates an import per‑
mit and a health certificate stating all of the same infor‑
mation, less one important difference: these birds may 
be vaccinated for HPAI, including subtypes H5 and H7, 
but the health certificate must clearly indicate whether 
or not the bird has been vaccinated. Zoo birds must also 
undergo a 30‑day quarantine period; however, this can 
occur at either a USDA facility or at an APHIS approved 
zoo.
Each of the three legal avian import centers in the 
United States kindly provided data regarding com‑
mercial and pet bird importation, specifically informa‑
tion relevant to species imported and country of origin. 
The Los Angeles import center received 29  164 psittac‑
ines between August 2013 and August 2016, the Miami 
import center received 34 psittacines for commercial 
or pet use during the 2015 federal fiscal year (Octo‑
ber 2014 through September 2015), and the New York 
import center received 28 psittacines during the 2015 
calendar year. Table 2 depicts the types of psittacines that 
were imported into the U.S. via the three animal import 
centers. Unspecified psittacines made up a huge major‑
ity of the imports (approximately 89%), with parrots and 
parakeets each accounting for about 5% of imports, and 
budgerigars, macaws, cockatiels, and cockatoos each rep‑
resenting a tiny proportion of psittacine imports.
The continent of origin for the vast majority of psitta‑
cines that were imported into the U.S. during the afor‑
mentioned time period was Africa, accounting for about 
85% of all imports (Table 3). Approximately 11% of psit‑
tacine imports were from Australia and 2% of imports 
were from each Asia and Europe, with few psittacines 
imported from either North or South America. It is 
important to note that the country of origin reported is 
where the birds come from prior to entry in the United 
States and is not necessarily representative of their true 
origin.
8.1.2  Legal movement of animal products, byproducts, 
and animal feed
All avian products and byproducts derived from an NDV‑
endemic region must be mitigated prior to importation 
Table 2 Types of  psittacines imported into  the U.S. 
through the three animal import centers—Los Angeles, CA 
(between August 2013 and August 2016), Miami, FL (dur-
ing the 2015 federal fiscal year), and New York, NY (during 
the 2015 calendar year) (n = 29 266)
Bird type Number imported








Table 3 Continent of  origin for  psittacines imported 
into  the U.S. through  the three animal import centers—
Los Angeles, CA (between August 2013 and August 2016), 
Miami, FL (during the 2015 federal fiscal year), and  New 
York, NY (during the 2015 calendar year) (n = 29 266)
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using an APHIS approved method that has been shown 
to inactivate NDV. Products and byproducts derived 
from NDV‑free regions are allowed to be imported in a 
raw form. Animal feed containing avian products must 
be cooked to an internal temperature of 74  °C prior to 
importation from NDV‑endemic regions; however, NDV‑
free regions may import raw animal feed products.
8.1.3  Illegal movement of live birds and their products
The illegal transport of live animals and their products is 
of concern for disease transmission because of the lack 
of governmental oversight, the types of products being 
moved, and their country of origin and final destination. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible 
for the confiscation of illegally imported products and 
specimens from domestic poultry species. Data provided 
by CBP depicts products and specimens from domes‑
tic poultry and birds that were confiscated in the cargo 
or express courier environment or via international mail 
facilities. Between calendar years 2012 and 2016, nearly 
75  000 products and specimens derived from domestic 
poultry and other birds were confiscated by CBP. The 
continent of origin for the majority of products and spec‑
imens (~88%) confiscated by CBP is Asia, which is enzo‑
otic for virulent NDV. Europe and North America, both 
of which are free from virulent strains of NDV in domes‑
tic poultry, comprise 7 and 3% of the poultry and avian 
confiscations, respectively. Products and specimens from 
Africa, Australia, South America, and unknown conti‑
nent of origin each comprise less than 1% of all confisca‑
tions. This data is summarized in Figure 2A.
A large number of samples from NDV susceptible spe‑
cies were confiscated and in many circumstances were 
derived from continents with regions that are enzootic 
for NDV. The exact number of products and specimens 
that are smuggled across the U.S. border is difficult to 
ascertain and it can be assumed that the products and/or 
specimens discovered represent a small subsection of the 
types of goods that are illegally imported into the United 
States. Because of the types of products confiscated and 
the regions of the world from which they originate, the 
illegal importation of domestic poultry and other avian 
products and specimens pose a risk for virulent NDV 
introduction.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service data show 
that nearly 400  000 wild avian specimens were illegally 
imported or improperly documented and were sub‑
sequently confiscated by the Fish and Wildlife Service 
between 2007 and 2016 in the United States. Our focus 
is on psittacines as they have demonstrated their capac‑
ity to shed infectious NDV for up to 1  year following 
infection. Psittacine specimen confiscations accounted 
for 1% of all the avian contraband confiscated and 75% of 
those confiscations were feathers, followed by 22% which 
was jewelry, and live birds, trim, skin pieces, carcasses, 
unspecified, trophy, and specimens each accounted for 
less than 1% (Figure  2B). These illegal seizure numbers 
are concerning as NDV can persist outside of the host, 
but overall, the risk they pose is likely lower than the risk 
associated with live birds.
Illegally imported psittacine specimens were con‑
fiscated at 20 different ports around the country (Fig‑
ure 3). It is important to note that the graphed data are 
based on the total number of specimens confiscated, 
not the number of individual events in which specimens 
were confiscated. For example, in New York, NY there 
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DESCRIPTION OF PSITTACINE SPECIMENS CONFISCATED BY 
U.S. FWS (2007-2016)
B
Figure 2 Country of origin and types of psittacine speci-
mens confiscated by CBP and FWS, respectively. A A pie chart 
depicting the continent of origin for the products and specimens 
confiscated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection between 2012 
and 2016 (n = 74 837). B A pie chart depicting the type of psittacine 
specimens confiscated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services between 
2007 and 2016 (n = 4046).
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confiscated between 2007 and 2016, but one of the inci‑
dences involved the confiscation of over 2000 feathers 
(n = 2004).
Estimating the percentage of illegally imported animals 
that are detected and confiscated in the United States is 
difficult; however, it is interesting to note the number 
of avian species, both those that are live birds, as well 
as feathers and other body parts, which are confiscated. 
These data suggest that illegal bird and bird product 
importation could result in an introduction of virulent 
NDV because of the types of birds being imported, the 
lack of veterinary oversight and quarantine procedures, 
and the country of origin (many of which are endemic for 
virulent strains of NDV).
8.1.4  Spillover event from wild avian species
Double‑crested cormorants and Columbiform birds, 
specifically pigeons and doves, have been implicated as 
amplification or reservoir hosts that appear to be fre‑
quently infected with, or carriers of, virulent strains of 
avian avulavirus [31, 37–41, 43–46]. Spillover events 
from these wild avian species into domestic poultry 
operations could have deleterious effects, both in terms 
of virus‑induced morbidity and mortality as well as eco‑
nomic impacts resulting from trade restrictions and the 
cost of controlling and eradicating the disease [5]. Addi‑
tionally, substantial economic losses are also associated 
with less virulent strains as a result of impaired growth, 
altered feed utilization, and reduced egg production in 
affected birds [73]. Due to the acute stability of NDV and 
the apparent overlap between double‑crested cormorant 
breeding and wintering grounds, rock dove habitat, and 
the majority of clustering relative to domestic poultry 
operations (Figure 1), a virulent strain harbored by wild 
avian species could spill over into domestic poultry. The 
most likely routes of virus introduction would either be 
a result of fomite transmission (vehicles, equipment, or 
personnel that become contaminated) or because of 
direct contamination of domestic poultry or their food or 
water sources by infected wild species. The latter is a risk 
primarily associated with pigeons because of their peri‑
domestic nature and this route of transmission has his‑
torically been reported for infection of domestic poultry 
by infected feces of wild pigeons [25]. The best method to 
prevent this type of transmission is to have vehicles and 
equipment that are site‑specific or that are thoroughly 
disinfected between operations, procedures with detailed 
information on biosecurity procedures following expo‑
sure to outside birds, and poultry housing facilities as 
well as food and water sources that are maintained in a 
setting that is inaccessible to nuisance creatures.
8.1.5  Spontaneous mutation
Avirulent and virulent viruses have varying amino acid 
sequences at the fusion site which allows for differen‑



























Locaon of psiacine specimens confiscated between 2007 and 2016
Figure 3 Psittacine specimens confiscated. Number of psittacine specimens confiscated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service between 2007 and 
2016 at various ports in the United States (n = 4046).
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systemic infection, respectively. The homology between 
virulent and avirulent viruses combined with the high 
mutation rate in RNA viruses make it possible for an 
avirulent strain to spontaneously mutate into a virulent 
strain. Only three amino acid substitutions are necessary 
for this transformation [75].
Between 2007 and 2009, multiple isolates of avian avu‑
lavirus were submitted to the National Veterinary Ser‑
vices Laboratory from turkey flocks in the United States 
and were found to have a fusion cleavage site of 113‑K‑Q‑
G‑R‑F‑117 [76]. This sequence contains two of the three 
necessary amino acids between 113 and 116, to be con‑
sidered a virulent strain, and a phenylalanine at site 117. 
Furthermore, these isolates were collected from flocks 
where the turkeys had signs of mild respiratory disease. 
Interestingly, pathogenicity tests in embryonated chicken 
eggs and day old chicks found these viruses to be low vir‑
ulence in chickens and are likely host‑adapted to turkeys. 
This finding however, is of concern as repeated viral pas‑
sages through infected birds elevates the probability of a 
spontaneous mutation into a virulent strain.
9  Conclusions
Virulent Newcastle disease virus, represented by vari‑
ous strains of avian avulavirus, is a highly transmissible 
virus that results in near‑uniform mortality in domestic 
poultry species. Furthermore, detection of virulent NDV 
is a mandatory reportable disease to OIE and results in 
severe, and often long‑lasting, restrictions in interna‑
tional trade. Economic losses associated with the disease 
extend well beyond trade embargos, including eradica‑
tion programs aimed at culling birds from infected farms 
and preventing further transmission between flocks. 
Double‑crested cormorants and rock doves have been 
implicated as a potential reservoir species in the United 
States, in addition to vaccinated domestic poultry spe‑
cies. Newcastle disease is a zoonotic disease; however, 
a huge majority of individuals who become infected are 
asymptomatic or develop a mild, self‑limiting disease. A 
plethora of diagnostic tools exist, ranging from virus iso‑
lation followed by pathotyping, to RNA detection, and 
serological methods. Continuing to closely monitor both 
domestic poultry as well as wild avian species is crucial 
in order to detect an outbreak quickly and eradicate an 
exotic introduction swiftly. This surveillance necessitates 
reliable diagnostic methodologies and preferably tools 
that can detect multiple pathogens simultaneously using 
metagenomics capabilities. Dimitrov et  al. describe a 
next‑generation sequencing approach for the characteri‑
zation of RNA virus genomes which allows for efficient, 
cost‑effective diagnostics [77]. Practicing robust bios‑
ecurity measures, especially those related to preventing 
pigeons from accessing food and water sources of 
domestic poultry, are essential for avoiding a disease 
outbreak.
Psittacines are often considered to be higher risk spe‑
cies as they can shed NDV for up to a year; however, the 
legal route of importation of these birds, and all others, 
into the United States is quite comprehensive. All legally 
imported birds are quarantined for 30 days during which 
time they are tested for NDV using the virus isolation 
assay and upon completion of the quarantine period and 
a negative NDV test, are released. Illegally imported birds 
that are confiscated are either euthanized or quarantined 
and tested prior to release, depending on oversight from 
both USDA Veterinary Services and U.S. Fish and Wild‑
life Service. The strict import regulations for live birds 
and their products, as well as stringent guidelines related 
to NDV as a Tier 1 Select Agent, are of high importance 
as human activities have been shown to result in spillo‑
ver events [78]. The illegal importation of birds and their 
products is difficult to control, manage, or regulate. This 
route certainly serves as a risk for NDV importation and 
subsequently, introduction.
The wild bird reservoirs of NDV found in the U.S. 
complicate the potential for viral incursion in domes‑
tic poultry. Understanding how these moderately and 
highly virulent viruses are maintained in pigeons and 
cormorants is fundamental to our comprehension of 
the landscape and other risk factors that substantially 
contribute to a viral incursion in domestic poultry. A 
surveillance program designed to sample birds of the 
Columbidae family could identify avian avulavirus 
strains circulating in wild birds and could also be used 
to assess the spillover of vaccines used in domestic 
poultry into wild bird populations. Additionally, sam‑
pling confiscated psittacine specimens that were ille‑
gally imported could provide increased understanding 
of the types of viruses that are entering the U.S. and 
may lead to prophylactic measures to protect poultry 
in the U.S. Backyard poultry flocks are believed to pre‑
sent a risk of viral amplification in the event of an NDV 
introduction as they are typically unvaccinated and 
extensively reared. NDV in backyard flocks that spilled 
over to commercial poultry operations was linked to the 
most recent outbreak in the United States and yields an 
ever‑present challenge. The discovery of virulent strains 
of NDV circulating in backyard chickens in Bulgaria 
and Ukraine between 2002 and 2013 suggests a domes‑
tic or urban cycle of viral maintenance [69]. Maintain‑
ing robust surveillance and reporting systems is crucial 
in order to detect and control a foreign animal disease 
outbreak, especially in an at‑risk population, such as 
backyard poultry.
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